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Resulting from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the 
government, law enforcement, and regulatory bodies have implemented sweeping changes in 
aviation and airport security.  State and federal governments, airports, airlines, and regulatory 
bodies have been tirelessly working together to prevent another attack that claims the lives of 
innocent people.  These entities have dedication countless amounts of money, time, and effort 
into improving airport and aviation security.  However, the vast majority of these resources have 
been committed to enhancing passenger screening procedures.  Few of these resources have been 
directed at preventing an insider attack.  The threat of an insider attack is constantly present.  The 
insider threat “results from the risk that results when malicious airline-airport employees have 
access to sensitive and restricted areas during the normal course of their required duties” (Black, 
2010, p. 1).  This threat can potentially come from “pilots, aircraft mechanics, aircraft fuelers and 
cleaners, and airline or contract employees who load baggage” (Black, 2010, p. 1).  Although not 
a widely publicized or acknowledged security risk, the insider threat in aviation is a serious 
security risk that warrants changes in the screening and hiring process for personnel with access 
to restricted areas and requiring personnel to undergo the same security screening as passengers. 
Instances of insider attacks predate the September 11, 2001 attacks and has haunted the 
aviation industry for decades.  A widely publicized insider attack was the accident of PSA Flight 
1771.  This insider attack was executed by disgruntled USAir employee, David Burke.  Burke 
was dismissed from USAir on December 7, 1987 after appearing before the company’s Board of 
Appeals for stealing $68 from a drink fund set up by USAir flight attendants.  Enraged by his 
dismissal, Burke plotted his revenge on supervisor Raymond Thompson.  Burke knew that 
Thompson commuted home every day aboard the PSA daily non-stop flight from his office at 
USAir Headquarters in Los Angeles to his home in San Francisco.  After purchasing a ticket on 
PSA Flight 1771, Burke used his USAir employee credentials, which had not been seized by the 
company after firing, to bypass security at Los Angeles International Airport with a loaded 44-
magnum pistol.  As the plane reached its cruising altitude of 29,000 feet, Burke sought out 
Thompson and opened fire, killing the unsuspecting supervisor.  As one of the flight attendants 
opened the cockpit door to inform the flight crew of the incident that had just occurred, Burke 
appeared in the cockpit door and opened fire on the flight crew, fatally shooting both pilots.  
Burke immediately seized control of the airplane and pitched the nose down, entering the plane 
into a rapid descent.  As the plane descended, it accelerated and built enormous amounts of 
airspeed.  The airplane was unable to endure the stress of reaching 1.2x Mach airspeed at 13,000 
feet.  Burke fatally shot himself moments before the airplane broke apart.  The crash of PSA 
Flight 1771 claimed the lives of all 44 passengers and crew onboard the airplane.  In response to 
this incident, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) “adapted policy to require that all 
members of any airline flight crew, including the Captain, be subjected to the same security 
measures as are the passengers” (“Special Report: PSA Flight 1771”, n.d., para. 9).  However, 
airport operators are extremely hesitant to enforce this federal regulation and it is still 
horrifyingly easy for pilots and other essential airport personnel to bring prohibited items into 
secure airport areas.  Airport operators are extremely hesitant to require the same daunting 
security measures for employees that passengers experience because it would agitate employees.  
This incident clearly shows how emotional, financial, and workplace problems can cause an 
insider to use an aircraft to end his/her own life or the lives of others in order to seek revenge.  
The example also readily shows how the lack of security and desire for revenge can take the 
lives of dozens of innocent individuals.  Requiring personnel to undergo the same security 
screening as passengers would have prevented this indecent and saved the lives of these innocent 
and unsuspecting passengers.  This incident is a prime example of why pilots and personnel with 
access to sensitive areas should undergo the same screening as passengers.   
A more recent and equally chilling example of an insider attack is the April 7, 1994 
hijacking of FedEx Flight 705.  FedEx employee Auburn Calloway was facing financial troubles 
and termination from the company.  Calloway was scheduled for a dismissal hearing with the 
company for lying about his previous flight experience.  Enraged by the scheduled dismissal 
hearing and desperate to support his ex-wife and two young children, Calloway saw his standard 
company life insurance policy of $2.5 million the only way to ensure his children received a 
college education.  However, the $2.5 million life insurance policy would only be paid out if 
Calloway was ““innocently” killed in an airplane accident” (Hamilton, n.d., para. 6).  Calloway 
plotted to take control of the airplane an intentionally crash the DC-10 into Federal Express 
Headquarters in Memphis, Tennessee.  This would accomplish the intention of leaving the life 
insurance policy to support his children and enacting revenge on the company who scheduled 
him for a dismissal hearing.  Calloway arrived early to fly jump seat aboard the flight from 
Memphis, Tennessee to San Jose, California.  He boarded before any of the flight crew arrived 
and stowed a guitar case which contained several hammers and spear gun.  The injuries 
Calloway planned to inflict on the flight crew with the hammers would appear only as blunt 
force trauma in an autopsy of the crew.  These blunt force trauma injuries would be consistent 
with injuries sustained in a typical catastrophic airplane accident.  Calloway also switched off the 
Cockpit Voice Recorder because there could not be any evidence of an intentional crash.  
Captain David Sanders, co-pilot Jim Tucker, and flight engineer Andy Peterson boarded the 
plane with no clue as to what they were in for.  They never remotely considered the possibility of 
“being hijacked by a fellow employee intending to kill you and fly your fuel-laden airplane into 
the Federal Express Memphis headquarters building in a suicidal attack” (Hamilton, n.d., para. 
3).  The flight crew didn’t know Calloway, but FedEx employees riding jump seat was not 
uncommon.  Soon after departure, Calloway began his plan of taking over the plane.  After a 
desperate struggle for survival, the flight crew was able to fight off Calloway’s attack and return 
to the airport safely.  This incident clearly demonstrates how external stressors such as financial, 
marital, workplace, and other problems cause influence an employee to plan and execute an 
insider attack.  The internal stressors and mental state of each crew member is extremely hard to 
detect and predict, but these factors could heavily influence that safety of the flight.  This 
incident also clearly demonstrates why pilots and personnel with access to sensitive areas should 
undergo the same screening as passengers.  If Calloway had been screened before boarding the 
plane, the weapons he carried would have been confiscated and this indecent would not have 
happened. 
The insider threat is often disregarded because some believe the threat is not prominent 
enough to enact tighter security measures.  However, the prevalence of these incidents are 
increasing and they are drawing attention to how realistic and probable an insider attack really is.  
The ease in which a member of the flight crew can hijack an airplane is astonishing.  Ethiopian 
Airlines Flight 702 was hijacked by 31-year-old co-pilot Hailemedhin Abera Tegegn on 
February 17, 2014.  As the pilot exited the cockpit to use the restroom, Tegegn locked the pilot 
out of cockpit and diverted the flight, which was en route to Rome, to Geneva, Switzerland.  
Tegegn was seeking asylum in Switzerland.  Although no passengers or crew members were 
harmed, this incident shows how easy an insider can take control of an aircraft and use it for 
his/her own intentions.  Specialists in aviation security say that “aviation insiders still have 
ample opportunities to sabotage flights” (Michaels, 2014, p. 1).  Philip Baum, managing director 
of London aviation security consulting firm Green Light Ltd., says, “We spend so much time in 
aviation safety on checking passengers for prohibitive items at checkpoints that we forget all 
other screening issues” (Michaels, 2014, p. 1).  This incident continues the trend of nine 
passenger planes being hijacked by pilots seeking asylum and three other cases since the late 
1990s where the pilots were suspected of intentionally crashing fully functional passenger jets 
(Michaels, 2014, p. 1).  Airline pilots were once revered and admired by the American public.  
They were regarded as capable and trustworthy individuals.  When boarding a flight, passengers 
do not fear a pilot hijacking the airplane.  They put their trust in the flight crew to get them to 
their destination safely.  When this trust is placed in the wrong hands, it makes passengers 
question how trustworthy the pilots really are and how well the airlines screen their applicants.  
Airline pilots are usually “screened before hiring and repeatedly assessed while on the job.  The 
frequency and thoroughness varies by airline and country” (Michaels, 2014, p. 1).  Federal 
aviation regulations outlining the thoroughness and frequency of pilot screening have not been 
amended or strengthened even after repeated incidents of pilot hijackings.  Many believe that 
these incidents do not occur often enough to warrant a change.  Vulnerabilities in the aviation 
and airport systems such as these will continue to be exploited by insiders who are intent on 
harming innocent people and the industry.  These problems will persist until regulations are 
modified and the screening process for applicants is changed. 
It would be extremely easy for critics to discount the relevance of the insider threat 
because most examples of this threat have occurred well before the implementation of all of the 
security enhancements of the post-9/11 era.  However, an eye-opening incident that has occurred 
in the post-9/11 era has brought into question the way we clear pilots for duty.  This incident is 
the crash of Germanwings Flight 9525 and the allegations that co-pilot Andreas Lubitz 
deliberately crashed the Airbus A320 into the French Alps, killing 144 passengers and six crew 
members.  The March 24, 2015 flight was enroute from Barcelona to Düsseldorf when Lubitz 
reportedly locked the captain out of cockpit, reprogrammed the autopilot for 100 feet and 
modified the autopilot settings several times in to order increase the airplane’s speed (Smith-
Spark & Haddad, 2015, para. 4).  Investigators found a tablet in Lubitz’s home which revealed 
that the distraught pilot had been researching suicide methods and cockpit security procedures.  
This accident “shows how little the industry and its regulators have done to acknowledge and 
address the most extreme manifestation of those psychological strains: pilot suicide” (Kulish & 
Clark, 2015, para. 5).  The entire incident could have easily been prevented had Lufthansa, 
parent company of Germanwings, or the dozens of medical professionals Lubitz sought help 
from reported concerns of Lubitz’s mental state to the appropriate regulatory body.  The lack of 
oversight by Lufthansa, Germanwings, German regulatory bodies, and European regulatory 
bodies resulted in a severely depressed pilot being allowed in the cockpit and killing over a 
hundred innocent and unsuspecting passengers. 
Another disturbing incident in the post-9/11 era is the gun smuggling ring involving a 
Delta Air Lines baggage handler based out of Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in 
December 2014.  31-year-old Delta baggage handler Eugene Harvey would bring guns into the 
secure area of the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport by using his security pass and 
would then hand them off to co-conspirator Mark Quentin Henry, a former Delta employee, after 
Henry passed through airport security.  The 45-year-old Henry was fired from Delta Air Lines in 
2010 for abusing the airline’s buddy-pass system.  Authorities say that Henry “took guns aboard 
at least 17 commercial flights this year [2014] from Atlanta to New York airports with the help 
of Harvey” (Muskal, 2014, para. 3).  Harvey and Henry were two of five people arrested for 
smuggling guns aboard commercial flights bound for John F. Kennedy International Airport in 
New York.  The group is accused of “conspiring to sell 153 firearms, including AK-47 assault 
weapons and 9-millimeter handguns” (Muskal, 2014, para. 3).  Harvey was charged with 
“trafficking firearms, violating airport security and aiding others in the smuggling scheme” 
(Muskal, 2014, para. 5).  Henry and the other three defendants were charged “in a 591-count 
indictment alleging conspiracy, first-degree criminal possession of a weapon and first-degree 
criminal sale of a firearm” (Muskal, 2014, para. 8).  This incident is a prime example of why 
changes need to be made to the screening and hiring process for personnel with access to 
restricted areas.  Insiders have knowledge of how to bypass airport security measures and can 
easily abuse this knowledge for their own gain.  The responsibility of having this knowledge 
should only be entrusted to the highest quality of candidates who do not have any indications that 
they will abuse this knowledge. 
Even when security measures are taken, persons with knowledge of these measures can 
easily take advantage of this knowledge.  This is highlighted by the recent discoveries that 
thousands of Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badges across the country are not 
accounted for and 1,450 SIDA badges were lost or stolen at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 
International Airport alone over a two year period.  These airport employee security badges 
“allow airport employees with secure access to enter securely locked doors throughout the 
airport” (Holden, 2015, para. 1).  Aviation security professionals and authorities are concerned 
because “the missing badges present serious concerns for security officials and are something 
terrorists would like to have possession of in order to compromise security” (Holden, 2015, para. 
2).  However, just because an individual possesses one of these badges does not mean they will 
gain access all secure parts of the airports because many airports use PIN number systems or 
biometrics (Holden, 2015, para. 5).  Although no one has gained access to the secured area of an 
airport using lost or stolen SIDA badges, it still poses a large security risk (Yamanouchi, 2015, 
para. 3).  These badges, along with other information obtained, could help facilitate in insider 
attack. 
The changes that need to be made in the hiring process for personnel with access to 
restricted areas and requiring personnel to undergo the same security screening as passengers are 
the responsibility of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  These security measures 
need to be included in federal regulations in order to mitigate an insider attack.  However, TSA 
has still not addressed this serious security risk.  TSA’s comprehensive risk assessment of airport 
security “did not consider the potential vulnerabilities of airports to an insider attack – an attack 
from an airport worker with authorized access to secure areas” (Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), 2011, p. 1).  Recent announcements of “random passenger-like screening of 
airline employees throughout the workday and biennial criminal history checks, until there is a 
system in place for “real-time recurrent” FBI background checks for all aviation workers” 
(Sternstein, 2015, para. 2) is seen by some as a first step in protecting against the insider threat.  
These measures include “better security screening of airport employees, and stepping up "the 
frequency of random and unpredictable" inspections of airport staff throughout the day” (Theen, 
2015, para. 7) and limiting access to secure areas.  However, some believe that “measures, such 
as random screening and security probes, are unable to effectively mitigate this threat” (Brandt, 
2011, para. 11).  Although a step in the right direction, these procedures will only have a 
minimal effect because there are several employees not being screened.  One possible way of 
fixing the holes in these measures is by requiring that “all staff members and all vehicles entering 
the airport must undergo security screening” (Lennerman, 2012, p. 227). 
The most logical and effective recommendations for changes and additions to the existing 
process of screening employees were presented in “Managing the Aviation Insider Threat” by 
Alan Black (2010).  In his thesis, Black suggests several changes to the current badging process.  
Under the current process, a criminal history records check is completed before an employee is 
issued their original badge, but the employee is not required to have an addition criminal history 
records check when his/her badge is renewed.  Requiring a criminal history records check every 
time an employee’s badge is renewed could unearth criminal behavior patterns that could 
indicate a potential insider threat.  Current criminal history records checks consider an 
individual’s criminal history for the preceding ten years.  This hinders aviation security 
professionals’ ability to acquire a complete profile on an applicant.  Criminal history records 
checks should be required to include an individual’s entire criminal history in order to discern an 
individual’s qualification to possess access to secure areas.  In addition, criminal and civil 
penalties for failing to self-report convictions of disqualifying crimes should be implemented.  
Employees are required to report convictions of disqualifying crimes to the employer or airport 
operator within 24 hours of conviction.  However, under the current regulations, employees who 
fail to report these convictions are not punished in any way.  Enforcing criminal and civil 
penalties for failing to report these convictions will increase the likelihood of employees self-
reporting.  Self-reporting convictions of these crimes is vital to airport security and will help 
mitigate the insider threat.  This policy should be taken further to include requiring employees 
with access to secure airport areas to report arrests related to disqualifying crimes because 
charges can be reduced or it could take months or years to reach a conviction.  Black also highly 
recommends eliminating proof of identification documentation that is not issued by the federal or 
state government and implementing the requirement that criminal history records checks must 
include an ability to verify information for a full 10-year term in the case of immigrants and 
include juvenile criminal records for employees under the age of 27 (Black, 2010).   
Once these changes are made to the existing process of screening employees, several 
additional measures should be implemented.  One addition measure that needs to be 
implemented is reviewing a credit history report on all employees that have access to secure 
airport areas before hiring and every time their badge is renewed.  Credit checks are another 
method of verifying an individual’s identity and provide information on the individual’s financial 
well-being.  Bankruptcy or other financial challenges can indicate an individual’s desperation 
and probability of carrying out an insider attack if given the proper incentive.  Individuals with 
less than desirable credit history should be closely monitored for criminal activity.  Another 
measure that should be implemented is reviewing an applicant’s work history for the preceding 
ten years.  This procedure can reveal behavioral patterns such as disciplinary actions, 
terminations, or other actions that are likely to be duplicated in the new work place environment 
at the airport (Black, 2010).  Behavioral patterns revealed in the applicant’s work history have 
the potential to reveal the applicant’s propensity to violate regulations and laws, and possibly 
execute an insider attack.  In addition to credit history checks and reviewing work history, 
applicants should also be required to provide a minimum of three personal references.  Personal 
references provide insight into the integrity of the applicant and the company he/she keeps.  A 
lack of personal references or references from associates with questionable backgrounds and 
behavioral patterns could be an indication of less than desirable behavioral tendencies by the 
applicant.  Perhaps the most important requirement that can be added to the employee screening 
process is the disclosure of all travel outside of the United States by all applicants and all 
incumbent employees with access to secure airport areas.  Specifically, “documentation 
demonstrating an individual’s travel history, including international locations that are otherwise 
regarded as unfriendly towards the U.S. and with a history of harboring, aiding or funding 
terrorist organizations” (Black, 2010, p. 39).  This is especially important given the recent trend 
of U.S. citizens traveling to countries with known training camps and havens for terrorist 
organizations and returning to the United States with plans to carry out terrorist attacks.   
One extremely important requirement that should be added to the employee screening 
process, but is often overlooked, is a psychological evaluation.  A psychological evaluation 
should be required of all applicants and existing employees.  The external stressors such as 
marital, financial, and emotional stressors need to be evaluated along with workplace demands in 
order to compile an accurate profile of the applicant and employee.  Internal conflicts cannot be 
seen by the naked eye and it is usually these conflicts that lead to employees becoming an insider 
threat and threatening the lives of others.  FedEx Flight 705, PSA Flight 1771, and Germanwings 
Flight 9525 are excellent examples of why psychological evaluations are needed for applicants 
and incumbent employees.  If psychological evaluations were part of the employee screening 
process, these incidents could have been avoided and many innocent lives could have been 
saved.  Psychological evaluations combined with requiring medical professionals to conform to 
regulations regarding disclosing medical diagnoses of aviation professionals to the employer and 
the proper aviation regulatory body.  Ensuring that medical professionals conform to these 
regulations can prevent incidents where pilots intentionally crash perfectly functioning passenger 
jets and take the lives of innocent and unsuspecting passengers.   
Although not a widely publicized or acknowledged security risk, the insider threat in 
aviation is a serious security risk that warrants changes in the screening and hiring process for 
personnel with access to restricted areas and requiring personnel to undergo the same security 
screening as passengers.  TSA is primarily responsible for implementing these changes to protect 
the American public from the insider threat.  Federal regulations to address this issue must 
encompass all possible threats because the “defense of air assets will become even more 
problematic in the face of a spectrum of threats enabled by technology and an accelerating 
insider threat” (Caudill & Jacobson, 2013, 31).  In today’s security environment, additional 
measures are needed to ensure that employees with access to secure areas will not violate that 
trust that is placed in them.  The recommendations discussed above could vastly enhance 
protection from an insider threat if implemented.  Passengers need to enlighten themselves of 
this danger and demand that authorities modify regulations in order to protect them from the 
insider threat.  Passengers should demand that essential personnel and flight crew encounter the 
same scrutiny before being allowed in secure airport areas.  However, most passengers are 
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